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NOTES
ROYALTY FINANCING AS A TOOL FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
I. Introduction
The undercapitalization of business,1 especially of small firms,2
has been recognized as one of the most serious hindrances to con-
tinued economic development. Because new, small businesses are
responsible for a majority of the new jobs created,3 policies
1. Litvak, New Development Finance Techniques, COMMENTARY 18 (April 1980) [herein-
after cited as New Development Finance Techniques]. Interest subsidies and tax abate-
ments have been used to help combat the undercapitalization of business. The Supreme
Court has defined undercapitalization as "an obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by
the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has frequently been an important
factor in cases denying stockholders their defense of limited liability." Anderson v. Abbott,
321 U.S. 349, 352 (1944). Because these methods have not been successful, see notes 22-23
infra and accompanying text, new methods of ensuring proper capital allocation are
necessary.
2. Kieschnick, Policies to Support New Businesses, COMMENTARY 21 (July 1980) [herein-
after cited as Policies to Support New Businesses]. The traditional sources of capital - debt,
equity and venture capital funds - are particularly ineffective methods of finance for small
firms. Entrepreneurs have found these sources inadequate, and therefore have tended to
avoid these methods even though they are available. See notes 5-18 infra and accompanying
text. Consequently, in the typical new firm, 81% of the capital comes from personal savings,
while contributions of equipment (a form of personal savings) provides eight percent of the
capital. Id. 75% of the new firms are capitalized solely with personal savings.
3. B. DANIELS & M. KIEsCHNICK, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE INNOVATIONS 19-20 (1978) (working papers drafted for the Council of State Plan-
ning Agencies) [hereinafter cited as 1978 WORKING PAPERS]. Nationwide, firms younger than
four years provide at least 50% of the new jobs created. In the Northeast, these firms are
responsible for 53.6% of the new jobs created, in the Midwest, 57.8%, in the South, 61.8%,
and in the West, 61.2%. New firms provide a greater percentage of the new jobs created
than do the older firms. For example, in the Northeast, firms five to eight years old provide
19.6% of the new jobs, firms 9-12 years old provide 14.2% and those firms 13 and older
provide 12.7%. Id.
There is a similar relationship between small firms and job creation. In the Northeast,
firms employing fewer than 11 employees create 32.6% of the new jobs, those employing 11-
50 create 30.6%; firms employing 51-251 create 25%; and those employing over 251 create
11.9%. Id. See also B. DANIELS & L. LITVAK, INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 25
(1979) [hereinafter cited as INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE]. For a discussion of
small firms and job-generation see D. BIRcH, THE JOB GENERATION PROCESS (1979) (a report
prepared for the United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Adminis-
tration, Office of Economic Research), reprinted in Proposed Development Legislation:
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designed to accelerate the formation and growth of these firms
have been advocated at all levels of government.4
Traditionally, firms have sought capital from one of three
sources - debt, equity and venture capital. Debt makes up the larg-
est portion of capitalization5 in new firms that obtain outside
financing.' Many new, small firms, however, are unable to obtain
loans.7 Even if a high-risk firm is able to obtain a loan, the debt
will expose the firm to several financial risks, which make debt an
ineffective mechanism for financing these firms.8 Equity, an invest-
ment in a firm entitling the investor to share in the income of the
firm, is the usual alternative to debt financing.0 "Financial experts
Hearings on H.R. 3405, 4098, 4099, 4100 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
4. Policies to Support New Businesses, supra note 2, at 21. "The impetus for these poli-
cies has been twofold: most state and local policies, seeking to stimulate large firms, have
failed to provide sufficient investment and employment; in addition, recent research has
produced abundant evidence that small firms dominate the marketplace in both job creation
and innovation." Id.
5. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 34. Small firms have a higher than average
debt-equity ratio, reflecting their difficulty in raising equity capital and their resulting reli-
ance on debt. The debt tends to be short term, often requiring repayment at a point in the
firm's development when it may not have the funds to repay the principal. INNOVATIONS IN
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 52. For manufacturing firms with assets valuing less
than one million dollars, debt comprises over one-half of the firm's capital structure. 1978
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 34.
6. See note 2 supra.
7. COUNCIL OF STATE PLANNING AGENCIES, FINANCING NEw BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 2
(June 1980) [hereinafter cited as FINANCING NEw BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT]. Debt requires
the borrower to repay the lender the principal borrowed plus a fixed amount as interest. A
lender's return on a loan to a successful firm will be no greater than a return on a venture
which is a complete failure. From the lender's point of view, there is little incentive to make
loans to businesses with any chance of failure, because it is not possible to earn greater
returns on successful ventures to cover inevitable losses. Id. See also THE COUNCIL OF STATE
PLANNING AGENCIES, ROYALTY FINANCING 1 (a report submitted by the National Governors'
Ass'n.), [hereinafter cited as ROYALTY FINANCING].
8. Debt financing usually requires a constant stream of payments from the debtor to the
creditor. Because new firms rarely have predictable revenues to cover the interest payments,
they are not the ideal candidates for debt financing. New firms require "patient money,"
which allows the borrower to use the money for a period of .time, with no repayment re-
quired until a firm has had time to generate revenues. RoYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at
4. Consequently, only firms with predictable cash flows should be financed primarily with
debt. In addition, because a loan to a new firm is so risky, a bank often requires an entrepre-
neur's personal assets as collateral. An unwillingness to jeopardize personal assets discour-
ages many potential firms from ever coming into existence. Id.
9. Id. An equity investment in a firm also requires the entrepreneur to relinquish a por-
tion of his control of the business to the investor. Equity is defined as a "share in a corpora-
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almost always assert that new technology based companies should
be financed primarily with equity."' 0 However, equity has several
characteristics which discourage its use."
Venture capital funding, the third traditional source of financ-
ing, is the segment of the capital market most oriented toward
financing new, high-risk companies. 12 When venture capitalists in-
vest in a firm, they traditionally rely heavily on equity financing.' s
A venture capital firm generally invests in several high-risk firms
with the expectation that the revenues from the successful ven-
tures will exceed the losses from failed ventures, thereby resulting
in a net gain." Venture capital financing was particularly success-
ful in the 1960's because venture capitalists were often able to sell
their interest at several times the initial investment when the small
tion, whether or not transferable or denominated [as] 'stock' or similar security." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(15)(A) (Supp. III 1979). "Stock is an equity; it represents an ownership interest. It is
to be distinguished from obligations such as notes or bonds which are not equities, and
represent no ownership interest." United States v. Evans, 375 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1967).
10. FINANCING NEW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 3.
11. Entrepreneurs refrain from equity financing because they wish to maintain control of
their businesses. "Many owners of small firms will object to public investment when it
means giving up a share of the business." Policies to Support New Businesses, supra note 2,
at 23.
Equity may also be an unfavorable method of financing a new firm from an investor's
point of view. Stockholders assume a greater risk than do bondholders. Stockholders will,
however, obtain a greater return if the venture is successful than will lenders, who are lim-
ited to a fixed return even if the venture is a success. FINANCING NEW BUSINESS DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 7, at 2. Because purchasers of equity are not entitled to a fixed return on
their investment until business costs, including interest payments, have been paid, investors
may not wish to purchase equity in a firm when its future earnings are far from certain,
even though the rate of return will be higher if the enterprise is successful. Id.
12. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 48. Venture capitalists
recoup their investments by selling the shares they have accepted from the firm in exchange
for the capital. Because the cost of selling the shares is so high, however, the venture capital
firms are instead investing in larger, older firms, which tissue a greater number of shares.
The sale of a larger number of shares will compensate the venture capitalist for accepting
the risk of the investment and will cover the transaction cost. In 1975, only five percent of
the venture capital industry's new investment went to start-ups. Id. For a discussion of
transaction costs, see note 43 infra and accompanying text.
13. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 2.
14. See notes 39-40 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of risk-pooling. Equity
gives the holder a right to share in a firm's income, but because these new, high-risk ven-
tures rarely generate income at the outset, venture capitalists make a profit by selling their
shares at an accelerated price when the firm goes public. RoYALITv FINANCING, supra note 7,
at 2. See also note 15 infra. A venture capitalist obtains a return by liquidating the invest-
ment at some future time, not by receiving dividends. Id.
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high-risk firm went public."5
Since 1970, however, fewer firms have been able to go public,
decreasing the importance of venture capital as a mechanism for
financing new firms." Because many new firms have been unable
to go public, venture capitalists have had to seek other methods of
investments.1 7 These alternate methods have proven unacceptable
and have contributed to a decrease in the use of venture capital as
a source for financing new firms. 18
This Note will first discuss the role that government has played
in providing adequate financing for new, small firms. It will ex-
amine both traditional government responses to capital market im-
perfections and more innovative capital allocation mechanisms.
Second, this Note will explain the use of the royalty financing
method by public financial intermediaries. Finally, England's Na-
tional Research Development Corporation and the Connecticut
15. "Go public" refers to a situation in which a privately controlled firm offers its shares
for sale on the market. Id. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(34)
(1976), defines offer for sale as "every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value."
16. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 2. There are several reasons for the infrequency
with which firms go public today. Investors are more concerned about risk today than they
were in the 1960's. Furthermore, a number of investment bankers who specialized in helping
young firms go public have failed or have been acquired by larger firms. Thus, most young
firms are deterred from going public at all. For those firms that do go public, capital is
substantially more expensive then it was in the 1960's. Id.
17. One alternate method for venture capitalists to liquidate their investment is to sell
the shares of the young company to a larger firm wishing to acquire the smaller firm in
order to obtain new products or to preempt possible competition. Id. The number of sell-
outs has increased as the ability of small firms to go public has decreased. Id. Most of the
acquisitions that take place are of those firms with the smallest amount of assets. In 1976,
76.1% of all acquisitions involved firms with less than $1 million in assets, while 11.5% of
the acquisitions involved firms with between $1 million and $2 million in assets. INNOVA-
TIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 48. Some entrepreneurs liquidate volunta-
rily, but others are forced to do so if they are to recover their investments at all. ROYALTY
FINANCING, supra note 7, at 2.
A second alternative for a venture capitalist to liquidate his investment in a firm is to
force the firm to buy back its shares by exercising a "put." When a venture capitalist exer-
cises a "put," he "forces the young company to buy back its shares at a high profit to the
venture capitalist." Id. New firms are reluctant to grant the venture capitalist the right to
exercise a put, because the firms could be forced to use their earnings to buy back their own
stock rather than to finance their expansion. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
18. The diminished importance of venture capital financing is illustrated by a study of
100 manufacturing firms in four cities, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Atlanta and Salt Lake City,
where no new, small firms received funds from organized venture capital firms. Policies to
Support New Businesses, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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Product Development Corporation ("CPDC"), intermediaries
which use the royalty financing method, will also be examined.
II. Government Intervention
Traditional sources of capital have proven to be ineffective tools
for financing small firms. As a result, government has become in-
volved in channeling capital to small businesses not only for the
.economic benefit such intervention might achieve, but also for the
social benefit realized in the form of product innovation.19 The re-
sponsibility for allocating capital, which is ordinarily undertaken
by the capital markets, has been partially assumed by the govern-
ment because private investment has not proved efficient.20 This
inefficiency is manifested in the market's failure to provide ade-
quate capitalization to small firms .even though, in many instances,
the small firms offer a better return on investment 1 than the
larger firms to which the market directs capital. Government has
used several tools to correct these inefficiencies and to direct capi-
tal to small firms. State and local governments became involved in
channeling capital to small businesses in an attempt to decrease
the cost of capital to these firms and to attract them to a particular
region2 2 and to bolster the local economy. Programs designed to
decrease the cost of capital, which range from interest subsidies 8
to tax abatements,2 ' have generally not been successful. Aid to
19. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 1.
20. See notes 5-18 supra and accompanying text.
21. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 25. Federal Trade Commis-
sion figures for the period 1972-76 show that manufacturing firms with under one million
dollars in assets produced an after-tax return on equity of 15.95%, while firms with over one
billion dollars produced a return of only 12.91%. Although the risk associated with an in-
vestment in a small firm is usually greater, it appears that an investment in the small firm is
warranted because of the higher return. Id. See also, 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3,
at 86.
22. New Development Finance Techniques, supra note 1, at 18. Traditionally, localities
believed that by decreasing the cost of capital through revenue bonds or tax abatements,
they could compensate for higher production costs or market disadvantages in their area. Id.
Revenue bonds and tax abatements, however, have been ineffective in influencing a firm's
locational choice. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
23. New Developement Finance Techniques, supra note 1, at 18. Interest subsidies are
granted to attract new firms to the area by decreasing the firm's cost of borrowing. For
example, "an interest subsidy that reduces the borrowing rate from 10% to 2.5% (about
twice the reduction provided by an industrial revenue bond) will on average increase a firm's
rate of profit by three tenths of one percent." Id.
24. Id. Tax abatements are granted to diminish or eradicate a firm's tax liability if a firm
1981] 983
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small, new firms is also provided through the grant of loans under
the auspices of the Small Business Administration." But like other
sources of debt financing, this method forces a firm to incur fixed
interest payments immediately,26 a financial burden most new
firms are unable to bear.2 7
Because these traditional modes of government financing have
not been responsive to firms' needs,' government has sought new
ways to ensure adequate capitalization of small firms. There are
three innovative methods which the government uses to effect effi-
cient capital allocation: first, administrative regulations, " second,
economic incentives 0 (which rely largely on altering the practices
agrees to locate in a particular area. Tax abatements have a minimal effect on the cost of.
new investment. "A mere 2- percent difference in unit labor costs between two areas could
offset a 40- percent tax difference." Id.
25. Aid to Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1976). The Small Business Adminis-
tration defines "small business" in several ways. One definition requires the business to be
independently owned, not to be dominant in its field, to have assets of less than six million
dollars, to have a net worth of less than six million dollars, and to have an average income
for the last two years of less than two million dollars. 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-11(a) (1980). In
subsection (b) the "small business" is defined primarily on the basis of the number of em-
ployees, or volume of sales, should the small business be unable to meet the standards of
subsection (a).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 633(c) (1976).
27. Policies to Support New Businesses, supra note 2, at 21-22. "[Tlhere is an excessive
amount of SBA ...loans available, providing precisely the wrong kind of capital to risky
ventures." Id. at 23. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
If the government decides that equity rather than debt is necessary, it can form a Small
Business Investment Company "SBIC". But because an SBIC, like a venture capital firm,
earns its profit by liquidating its equity in a business, see note 14 supra and accompanying
text, it has trouble obtaining a return on its investment. See notes 14-18 supra and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of SBIC's see The Small Business Investment Incentive Act
of 1980 & Venture Capital Financing, 9 FORDHAM URn. L. J. 865 (1981).
28. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 52. State programs are often
designed to aid existing large companies which traditionally have access to the capital mar-
kets. As a result, small, undercapitalized firms do not get the type of help they need. Id. For
example, although the Connecticut Product Development Corporation ("CPDC") uses the
royalty financing method, which is particularly well-suited for financing new firms, the
CPDC primarily finances existing firms. See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of New York regulations designed to ensure a more efficient alloca-
tion of mortgage money see Redlining, Disinvestment and the Role of the Mutual Savings
Banks: A Survey of Solutions, 9 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 89 (1980).
30. Economic incentives usually take the form of loan guarantees for small firms. New
Development Finance Techniques, supra note 1, at 19. For a discussion of loan guarantees,
see Lukens Steel Co. v. Klutznick, 629 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1980) (court held that "[the Eco-
nomic Development Administration's] decision to apply the concept of aggregate production
in measuring changed production levels resulting form [sic] its assistance to a [steel pro-
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of private financial intermediaries), and finally, publicly-owned
financial intermediaries which make funds available to firms hav-
ing difficulty obtaining financing through the private capital
markets.3 1
Administrative regulations can be successful in affecting the flow
of private capital. Regulations which force institutions to make
loans they consider undesirable may cause the withdrawal of funds
from the regulated institutions.3" Economic incentives to increase
the flow of capital to underfinanced firms usually take the form of
loan guarantees. These guarantees are not capital subsidies; rather,
they promote the flow of capital to deserving firms.33
Public financial intermediaries, which have been implemented
by several states," provide the third alternative to traditional
financing methods. One important attribute of the intermediaries
is their flexible use of financing methods. s6
ducer was] . . . arbitrary and inconsistent with the purpose of the Act," id. at 890, where
the steel producer sought EDA assistance specifically for the acquisition of equipment in-
tended to effect a change in product mix. Id. at 889.) and CF&I Steel Corp. v. Economic
Dev. Admin., 624 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980) (court held that there was a rational basis in fact
for guaranteeing a loan where it was believed that the demand for the product would absorb
the increased output financed by the loan.) Id. at 140.
31. New Development Finance Techniques, supra note 1, at 18-19.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Connecticut Product Development Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-32 to
32-47 (West Supp. 1980). See also Commercial Fishing and Agriculture Bank, ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.81 (Michie 1980); Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 40G, §§ 1-10 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
35. Some of the intermediaries provide debt to new firms, others provide equity. For an
example of an intermediary that provides debt, see Commercial Fishing and Agriculture
Bank, ALASKA STAT. § 44.81 (Michie 1980). The Bank has the power to "make variable rate
or fixed rate loans to individuals who are residents and who are engaged in commercial
agriculture or fishing, including harvesters, processors, suppliers and marketers, or to corpo-
rations, partnerships or joint ventures engaged in commercial agriculture or fishing .... Id.
§ 44.81.210(1).
A Massachusetts intermediary provides equity financing. See Massachusetts Technology
Development Corporation, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.40G, §§ 1-10 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). The
corporation is empowered to "finance, conduct, or cooperate in financing or conducting tech-
nological, business, financial, or other investigations which are related to or likely to lead to
business and economic development by making and entering into contracts and other appro-
priate arrangements, including the provision of grants, loans, and other forms of assistance."
Id. § 3.
One intermediary provides firms with capital in return for a stream of royalties from the
sale of products the capital helped develop. The Connecticut Product Development Corpo-
ration uses the royalty method. The CPDC is the only American intermediary to use this
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Public financial intermediaries have been used for a variety of
developmental activities, ranging from product innovation to re-
gional development and housing finance.3 6 Of particular concern
are those intermediaries actively involved in the capitalization of
new enterprises and the expansion of new enterprises as a means
of increasing employment and strengthening the local economy. 7
These intermediaries provide five principal benefits within these
areas of concern: they offer opportunities for risk-pooling through
their diverse portfolios; they decrease the cost of information-gath-
ering; they decrease the cost of financial transactions; they increase
competition in the capital markets; and they can be used to pursue
non-discriminatory lending practices."8
The major benefit provided by public financial intermediaries is
risk-pooling, an opportunity not generally available in the private
capital markets.3 9 An individual investor might not be willing to
completely underwrite a high-risk venture for $100,000; he might,
however, be more likely to invest $100,000 in a fund composed of
several risky investments, with the expectation that if the fund's
profits did exceed its losses, his investment would result in a net
gain.40
method. For a discussion of this intermediary, see notes 101-25 infra and accompanying
text.
36. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 187. These development institutions have
also been used to invest in large scale enterprises, to provide expansion capital for small and
medium scale enterprises, to finance local community development, to provide working
capital finance and to finance infrastructure repair and improvement. Id.
37. For example, the Connecticut Development Corporation's stated purpose is "to stim-
ulate and encourage the development of new products within Connecticut by the infusion of
financial aid for invention and innovation in situations in which such financial aid would not
otherwise be reasonably available from commercial sources. . . ." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
32-39 (West Supp. 1980). Prior to enacting the legislation the legislature found "that there
exists in the state a great and growing need for industrial and commercial development and
activity to provide and maintain employment and tax revenues. Id. § 32-33.
38. See notes 39-45 infra and accompanying text.
39. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 72. Risk-pooling is accom-
plished by spreading a high-risk investment over several investors' portfolios so that each
investor bears a minimal risk. Id. The risk-pooling concept is also employed by venture
capitalists, who generally invest in several high-risk firms, hoping that the revenues from
successful ventures will offset losses from failed ventures and result in a net gain. See note
14 supra and accompanying text.
40. By spreading a risky investment over several investors' portfolios, each investor min-
imizes his risk. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 45.
Consider a single investment with an expected rate of return of 10%, but with a 50%
986 [Vol. IX
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The second benefit provided by a financial intermediary springs
from its primary benefit of risk-pooling. Because of its diverse in-
vestment portfolio, the intermediary should function as a risk-
spreading institution. As a result, potential investors should re-
quire less information prior to making an investment.4 Thus the
cost of providing such information will be decreased.4 2 Similarly,
because the intermediary deals with a large number of small enter-
prises, the cost of a public offering of shares can be spread over
several firms offering shares for sale, thereby reducing transaction
costs per firm.43 A fourth benefit derived from intermediaries is an
increase in competition in the capital markets, which may increase
the volume of loans to new businesses by commercial banks. 4 Fi-
nally, public intermediaries can pursue a nondiscriminatory policy
chance of losing 10% and a 50% chance of returning 30%. Risk-adverse individuals
will have different responses to this sort of investment depending on its size (and
hence the size of possible gains and losses). If 100 investors have $500 in assets, and
the investment is $500, each investor acting alone may be unwilling to take the 50%
chance of a 10% loss. But if all 100 investors purchased equal shares of the invest-
ment, each would face a potential loss that in absolute terms is much smaller. Inves-
tors facing this choice will typically demand a proportionately smaller risk premium.
Id.
41. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 151.
42. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 73. Because the risk is
spread over several portfolios, each investor will not require as much information. The inter-
mediary, because it will deal with large numbers of firms, will rely on economies of scale to
diminish the cost of information gathered per firm. Id.
43. Id. The transaction cost is the cost of a public offering of securities. The minimum
transaction cost of a public offering now exceeds $25,000. The total transaction cost of 20
debt issuances of $1,000,000 each would exceed $500,000. If a financial intermediary obtains
the funds in a $20,000,000 umbrella revenue bond offering, however, there will be just one
transaction cost of about $25,000. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 153.
Small corporations incur a greater percentage of transaction costs from the sale of securi-
ties than do corporations issuing larger quantities of stock. When less than $1,000,000 worth
of bonds are issued at one time, 11.49% of the proceeds from the sale are necessary to cover
the cost of the sale, whereas on an issue of over $50,000,000, only 1.19% of the proceeds are
used to cover costs. Similarly, on the sale of common stock, 27.15% of the proceeds are
necessary to cover costs on an offering of less than $500,000, whereas only 5.37% of the
proceeds will be required to cover the expenses on an offering of greater than $50,000,000.
Id. at 51. The intermediary facilitates investment in smaller firms by combining transac-
tions to decrease transaction costs per-firm. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra
note 3, at 73.
44. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 73. The intermediary may
even increase competition in the commercial bank markets. The impact will depend on the
particular segment of the market in which the intermediary operates, the intermediary's
size, and the terms it offers. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
in making capital available to small firms.
The method selected to finance the intermediary can have an
effect on the cost of capital both to the intermediary and to the
firms being financed by it. The intermediary is usually funded by
the sale of tax-exempt bonds.' 6 Bonds which more strongly obli-
gate a state to assume liability in the case of a default will gener-
ally have a correspondingly higher credit rating and a lower cost of
borrowing.' 7 Because general obligation bonds impose the strongest
obligation on a state, the cost of the funds to the intermediary can
be minimized through the use of such bonds. These savings can be
passed along to those firms which the public intermediary finances.
. Although the intermediaries have several unique benefits, they
are not without problems. First, the intermediaries are often man-
aged by persons from the banking community who have the atti-
45. Id. For example, one of the goals of the Alaska Fishing and Agricultural Bank is to
eliminate the traditional prejudice banks have had against financing fishermen. Id.
46. General obligation bonds are backed by the "full faith and credit" of the issuer,
thereby giving an unlimited guarantee to its investors that the issuer "will raise funds by
whatever necessary and to the fullest extent of its ability in order to honor its obligation."
Greenberg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAW 338,
340 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Securities]. See also Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker,
Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 499-501 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 41
N.Y.2d 644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 370 N.Y.S.2d 842, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 808 (1977); S.
SANTO & A. VAN ALYSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 581-97 (2d ed. 1977). Reve-
nue bonds, on the other hand, are repaid solely from the revenues generated by a specific
income-producing facility acquired or constructed with the proceeds of the bond. Municipal
Securities, supra, at 341. See L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCE 317-21 (1975). Revenue bonds, unlike general obligation bonds, are
not payable out of taxes, but instead are paid from the revenues of the specific facility
financed by the bonds. Finally, moral obligation bonds are revenue bonds, which are secured
by a "make-up" clause which allegedly furnishes a second tier of security to the investor.
This "make-up" clause is a device which has the effect of making an otherwise unmarket-
able issue marketable. See Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Com-
monly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 521 (1971). The "make-up" provision has
been held to create a moral obligation upon the state to repay bondholders. See Massachu-
setts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England's Merchant Nat'l Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d
599 (1969); Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1976); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). But see
Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Comm. Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100, 1129 (Wyo. 1978)
(striking down a "make-up" clause the court stated, "we question the ethics of government
utilizing such a merchandising technique"). For a discussion of the problems created when
the New York State Urban Development Corporation defaulted on its moral obligation
bonds, see Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security? 8 URR. LAW. 54, 62-69
(1976).
47. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 74.
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tudes of conventional lenders. 8 As a result, management of the in-
termediaries has not been aggressive enough in seeking appropriate
candidates for aid.49 Second, because the banks are often inti-
mately involved with the financing of these intermediaries, the
banks are in a position not only to evaluate investment proposals
but occasionally, to persuade the less risky financing candidates to
accept private financing from the bank. 0 Third, intermediaries
have operated at too high a debt-equity ratio to finance high-risk
growth operations. 1 Many intermediaries have had to avoid risk-
ier ventures to ensure a sufficient cash flow to service debt obliga-
tions.52  Further, the broad and diverse ownership 5s of the in-
termediaries can create conflicting goals and policies which make it
difficult for an investor to assess management policy and to deter-
mine what position the intermediary will take in a given
situation. 4
Once a public financial intermediary is established, a method of
repayment for firms receiving capital must be determined. A pub-
lic intermediary functions efficiently as a capital-channeling mech-
anism only if it supplies the proper type of capital to a deserving
firm.5 5 If the intermediary uses an ineffective financing method
48. Id. at 84.
49. Id. Development corporations often have small staffs and only one office. The corpo-
rations lack the funding to travel around the state in search of prospective aid recipients.
Similarly, if the corporation is centrally located, small businessess may not be aware of its
existence. A decentralized corporation would make the corporation's resources available to
more businesses. Id.
50. Id. The borrower may withdraw its application after loan approval because a bank
may be willing to make a loan to the company because the development corporation investi-
gated the company and found it credit-worthy. Thus, it is possible for private intermediaries
to benefit from the work of the development corporations. Id. This problem is alleviated by
the royalty method, because at the time the grant is made the firm and the intermediary
decide how long the intermediary will be entitled to receive royalties from the firm. Because
the grant does not have to be repaid by the firm, there is no chance that the firm will
refinance at more favorable terms if it becomes successful. See notes 60-61 infra and accom-
panying text.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The owners of business development corporations are often banks, insurance
companies and thrift institutions. Id.
54. Id. at 84. "One is often left with the impression that the [business development cor-
poration] is a charitable organization run by volunteers who are seeking to do good, rather
than an aggressive, innovative, and profitable market correcting organization." Id. at 84-85.
55. See RoYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 1-5.
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such as debt,5 equity, 7 or venture capital funds"8 to finance the
new small, firm, its effectiveness as a financing mechanism is
greatly diminished.
What is needed is a financing mechanism that can be used by
the state intermediary to channel capital to deserving firms. The
ideal financing mechanism for a small firm should have four
characteristics:
First, it should not require the firm to make payments before a product
achieves some success ("patient" money); next, it should not place the firm
in the position of being sold out against its interests to a competitor or
larger firm; third, it should allow the investor to achieve high returns if the
firm or product is successful to compensate for risk and inevitable losses
elsewhere; and finally, this high return should be achievable by means other
than capital gains dependent on selling the security; [that is,] the return
should be achievable even without the security being liquid. 9
III. The Royalty Method
The royalty method possesses each of these desirable character-
istics. Under this method, a firm enters into a contract with an
investor whereby the firm receives a grant to facilitate the develop-
ment of a product and promises to pay royalties in return.60 These
royalties are based either on the total sales of the firm, if the grant
is made to the firm as a whole, or on the sales of a specific product,
if the grant is made to develop that product.6"
The royalty method has several advantages. First, because no
royalties need be paid until a product begins to generate revenues,
there is no drain on the firm's cash flow at the outset. This is a
clear advantage over financing by debt, which requires interest
payments almost immediately.' Once sales begin, however, the
firm will feel the effect of repayment more quickly than it would if
56. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
59. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. This is in contrast to venture capital firms, which sponsor companies, not
projects. In addition, the contract should specify the rate at which the royalties are to be
paid and the consequences if the firm is acquired. Id. For example, the contract should
specify whether the firm receiving the grant remains liable for the royalty payments if the
company acquiring the firm defaults. Further, provision should be made to determine who
controls patents developed with the royalty financing funds.
62. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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it were financed with equity, because young profitable firms gener-
ally funnel the majority of their earnings back into the firm." Fur-
ther, because an investor does not own shares in the firm, he can-
not force the company to sell out, alter the firm's organizational
structure or hinder the independent management of the firm. 4
Third, because the royalties which flow to the investor are based
on sales volume, an investor has the opportunity to receive a
greater return on his investment if the product is successful. The
fact that the return is not dependent on a firm's ability to go "pub-
lic" encourages investors to make grants to small local companies
which are unable to go public."
The royalty method also has several tax advantages. First, the
firm may deduct the royalty payments as a business expense."
This is a significant advantage over equity, from the firm's point of
view, as dividends are paid out of after-tax income. Second, the
royalty method also avoids the double tax on dividends." A firm
can deduct its royalty payments, reducing its taxable income and
therefore its tax liability."
IV. The National Research Development Corporation
The National Research Development Corporation ("NRDC"),
which was established by England's Development of Inventions
Act in 1948,"' was the first public intermediary to use the royalty
63. J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 447-48 (5th ed. 1979).
Young, growing firms generally reinvest their earnings rather than pay dividends. Id.
64. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 5.
65. Although the royalty method provides a return without a liquidation, the right to
future royalties can be sold by the investor entitled to the royalties. Id.
66. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3). Royalty payments are similar to payment of interest on debt in
that they are both deductible. Id. § 163.
67. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 79. Dividends are distributed to the share-
holder out of income on which the corporation has already paid tax. When the dividend is
received by the shareholder it is taxable to him as ordinary income. Thus, the same income
is taxed twice. Id. For a discussion of the double tax see B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §§ 1.03, 1.08, 2.01, 5.06 (4th ed.
1979).
68. This deduction is generally a favorable one for a new firm because the resulting af-
ter-tax income is greater, thereby making more money available to expand operations. See
note 63 supra.
69. Development of Inventions Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.60 (current version at 1967,
c.32 as amended by Industrial Expansion Act, 1968, c.32, § 11 and Industry Act, 1975 c.68, §
26).
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financing method. The NRDC was established to achieve two
goals. First, the NRDC was devised to ensure full exploitation of
British inventions,7 0 particularly those developed in government
research establishments and in government-financed universities. 1
The NRDC is authorized to administer, organize and exploit pub-
licly-owned patents7 in order to ensure that full and proper use is
made of British inventions. The NRDC was also expected to act as
a liaison between research and industry, to hasten the develop-
ment of inventions into marketable products 73 and to encourage
new inventive talent.74
The NRDC's second goal is an extension of the first. By encour-
aging inventions, the NRDC was expected to help close the gap in
the British balance of payments75 and to maintain the British
70. 451 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2676 (1948). In his introduction of the bill, Harold
Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, stated that it would be in England's best
interest to make better use of its inventions in order to maintain its competitive edge in the
world. Id. The Members of Parliament were particularly concerned with American indus-
try's ability to exploit commercially those inventions first developed in England. Wilson
cited penicillin as an example of a British invention developed by Americans which the
British eventually had to pay royalties to use. Id. at 2682.
71. Id. at 2679. Mr. Wilson explained,
Government Departments and Government research organizations are not the kind of
people who would themselves be interested in developing the results of their inven-
tions. That is even more true, I think, in the case of discoveries and inventions made
in the process of more fundamental research at the universities. . . . But it is because
industry has its own facilities and is, on the whole, extremely successful in developing
those inventions, that we have not found it necessary to make very much provision on
that side.
Id. at 2677. The NRDC, however, also has the power to develop inventions, when they are
not sufficiently exploited by the private sector. See Martin, The Development of Inventions
Act, 1948, 3 INDUS. L. REV. 225, 226 (1949). See also text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
72. Bard & Zvegintzov, The Work of the National Research Development Corporation,
DiscovERy, 287-88 (July 1955) [hereinafter cited as The Work of the NRDC]. Those con-
cerned with the administration of public services felt that centralized management of pub-
licly-owned patents was necessary to increase efficiency. This responsibility had previously
been that of the individual government department that developed the particular invention.
Id.
73. Id. Scientists believed that such a corporation would enable science to be applied
more quickly and decisively to industry. Id. During World War II, the Scientific Advisory
Council recommended setting up an organization, independent of government departments,
to take control of inventions arising out of public research to allow industry to make full use
of them. As a result, the NRDC was established to ensure full use of British inventions.
Martin, The Development of Inventions Act, 1948, 3 INDUS. L. REV. 225, 226 (1949).
74. The Work of the NRDC, supra note 72, at 288.
75. 451 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 2695 (1948). One House member, M. Philips Price,
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standard of living. 76
The NRDC's normal duties arise upon completion of the basic
research on a project and cease just prior to production and distri-
bution.7 7 The Board of Trade, however, may permit the NRDC to
provide financial assistance to research projects likely to lead to an
invention,78 or to finance production and distribution.
The NRDC is generally permitted to function within these limits
only when "the public interest so requires."80 Patent rights for in-
ventions developed in the public sector may be acquired, however,
expressed this view when he stated,
The House can do no better work than to pass a Measure which even in a small way
increases our industrial efficiency and aims at closing the gap in our balance of pay-
ments. We can only hold our own in the world today if our methods of production are
on the very highest level of efficiency, and for this we need all the best technical
improvements that science can give to industry and agriculture.
Id. Parliament believed that by fully exploiting British inventions, the nation's industrial
efficiency could be enhanced, making British products more attractive on the world market
and thus providing England with a more favorable balance of payments. Id. at 2676.
76. This would occur not only as a result of the modern conveniences developed to im-
prove the quality of life but also by the expansion of industry and employment to produce
these goods. No mention was made in the parliamentary debates of the increased employ-
ment which might result from the Act. Nor was any mention made of the increased tax
revenues that might result from the improved state of industry. 451 PARL. DES., H.C. (5th
ser.) 2676-745 (1948); 155 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 568-90, 753-54 (1948); 157 PARL. DEs.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 1206-08 (1948).
The NRDC appears to have focused primarily on revitalizing British industry after the
war and secondarily on affecting the economy. The British, however, were not unaware of
the economic ills the NRDC could help to remedy. "A 1943 British White Paper concluded
that insufficient British private investment was being made to convert pure research into
commercially applicable innovations. This failure to make sufficient investment in the re-
search development was determined to be sufficiently costly to the growth and development
of the British economy to warrant a public investment in NRDC." 1978 WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 3, at 142.
The Connecticut Product Development Corporation, which is modeled after the NRDC,
does, however, state that its purpose is to expand employment and increase tax revenues.
See notes 106-07 infra and accompanying text.
77. The Work of the NRDC, supra note 72, at 287. "Between these two limits [the
NRDCJ can do practically anything to fill any gap in the development of the inventions
from the laboratory stage to the point at which they can be used industrially." Id. The
NRDC was viewed by Parliament as a gap filler between basic research and production. 451
PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 2694-95 (1948).
78. The Work of the NRDC, supra note 72, at 287. Financial assistance might be given
where the research would be likely to lead to an invention which is in the public interest,
such as a new medicine.
79. Id. The Board might permit the NRDC to produce a product when the product is in
the public interest and is not presently being produced privately.
80. Development of Inventions Act 1967, c.32, § 2(1).
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held or disposed of when public interest is not a factor. 8' The typi-
cal functions that require a public interest include development
and exploitation of inventions resulting from public research, or
any other invention which is not being sufficiently developed or
exploited;8 2 promotion and assistance in new research for satisfying
specific practical requirements;83 and assisting in the continuation
of research which may lead to inventions of practical
importance. '8 4
The NRDC is funded by advances from the Treasury, 85 which
may not exceed fifty million pounds.86 These advances are used to
make grants to carry out the NRDC's corporate functions. The
royalties that flow to the NRDC are expected to make it self-sus-
taining, covering not only administrative expenses but also the ad-
vances made to the corporation. 87
Although the Developement of Inventions Act does not specify
that the NRDC should use the royalty financing method, the
NRDC has adopted this method to provide grants88 to finance
these functions set forth in the Act. If the grant results in the de-
velopment of a product or process, the corporation holds a patent
on that product or process. The NRDC then ordinarily licenses the
patent to private industry in return for a stream of royalties from
the sales of the product.8 9 The inventions that the NRDC develops
81. Id. § 2(1)(b). The NRDC was designed to focus primarily on inventions from the
public sector, but may also deal with private inventions, when the public interest so
requires.
82. Id. § 2(1)(a).
83. Id. § 2(1)(c). Before this function is carried out the Board must find that the re-
search is likely to lead to an invention. Id. The statute provides no criteria for determining
the likelihood that research will lead to an invention.
84. Id. § 2 (1)(d). Before this function is carried out the Board must find the the contin-
ued research is likely to lead to an invention. Id. As with § (c), see note 110 infra, the
statute provides no standards for determining whether the continued research will lead to
an invention.
85. Id. § 7(1).
86. Id. § 7(2), as amended by Industrial Expansion Act, 1968, § 11. The initial limit on
advances from the treasury was £ 5,000,000. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, § 7(2).
87. 451 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2676, 2685 (1948), "[The Corporation] should conduct
its activities in such a way as to pay its way and, in due course, it should repay the Govern-
ment .. " Id.
88. Id. Developement of Inventions Act, 1967, c.32, § 2.
89. For a discussion of the licensing process, see Selling Inventions, THE TiMES REVIEW
OF INDUSTRY at 5, 7. (Feb. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Selling Inventions].
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are often risky ones,90 but because the NRDC has a large pool of
patents, it is expected that the revenue from successful projects
will exceed the losses on unsuccessful ventures and result in a net
gain.91
The NRDC is generally acknowledged to be a success.9 2 Al-
though it is difficult to determine exactly what effect the NRDC
has had on the British economy,"s it appears that the corporation
has achieved its goal of greater exploitation of British inventions.
For example, the NRDC has been instrumental in the development
90. The NRDC will develop inventions which show promise of national significance, but
which private industry is not willing to sponsor at their current stage of development. Id. at
7-8.
91. Id. at 8.
The substantial risks inherent in an innovation are illustrated by the small number of
inventions that become revenue earning and in particular the very small numbers
which yield substantial income when compared with the number submitted. The
risks, however, can be reduced if the scale of activities is large enough to cover a
significant number of inventions so that, at least, some of these are likely to be
successful.
Id. The NRDC undertakes risk-spreading activities by encouraging industry to adopt new
products and processes invented in the United Kingdom, providing funds when necessary to
bring the invention to a commercially viable stage and by entering into joint ventures with
firms to develop their inventions. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, note 7 supra, at 190-91.
92. "For some time the [NRDC] was shunned by industry as a socialist device for back
door nationalization. But endorsement by the Conservative Governments together with the
cost and complexity of innovation brought a change of heart. Even the Federation of British
Industries recommended state pump priming for civil research." The Project Pushers,
TIMEs REV. INDUSTRY & TECH. 28 (Sept. 1965). See also Catalytic Corporation, ENGINEERING
653 (Nov. 21, 1958).
93. Some commentators, including Belden Daniels and Michael Kieschnick, have sug-
gested that the NRDC has resulted in an overall economic benefit. See 1978 WORKING PA-
PERS, supra note 7, at 142.
The risk spreading of the citizens of the United Kingdom generated through the pub-
lic investment of tax dollars as forced savings was projected to be a high-risk invest-
ment with substantial future profit potential and benefit to the British economy. This
has turned out to be true. Primarily because of two extremely successful and profita-
ble investments, in the creation of the Hovercraft and the antibiotic Cephalosporn,
NRDC now has a substantial internal return on investment which is providing an
income stream sufficient to cover hundreds of other R&D investments and losses.
Id. See also Selling Inventions, supra note 89, at 8. The economic benefit of a product may
continue long after its royalty flow has ended. The product may help a firm build up good
will in a particular market, or eventually lead to a new generation of products. Selling In-
ventions, supra note 89, at 8.
94. The NRDC has been largely responsible for the development of the computer indus-
try in Britain. Catalytic Corporation, ENGINEERING 653 (Nov. 21, 1958). Of the 10,500 inven-
tions submitted from 1949-62, 2,600 were assigned for exploitation, and about 1000 license
agreements were completed at home and abroad. Selling Inventions, supra note 89, at 7.
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of the computer industry,"6 the Ricardo Engine 6 and various med-
ical products.97 Although the royalties received by the NRDC have
not been sufficient to repay funds advanced to the corporation,"8
the royalties have been sufficient to cover the NRDC's administra-
tive expenses.9 9 Moreover, the benefits of new products may con-
tinue long after the royalty payments have ceased.1"' For example,
in addition to new products developed, a new generation of related
products may be marketed based on the goodwill generated by the
original product.
V. The Connecticut Product Development Corporation
England's success with the royalty method led the Connecticut
legislature to study010 and eventually to establish the Connecticut
Product Development Corporation ("CPDC") in 1972.102 The
CPDC is the only financial intermediary in the United States that
used the royalty financing method. 03 The CPDC is designed to
stimulate the development of new products by providing aid to
firms unable to obtain financing from conventional sources. e'0
The Connecticut legislature had determined that there was a
95. The Work of the NRDC, supra note 72, at 288. During the corporation's first seven
years the NRDC had 160 computer patents outstanding. Id.
96. Id. at 290. The Ricardo engine is a steam engine which runs on low grade fuels such
as sawdust. Id.
97. Id. For example, the NRDC financed the development of hecogenin, a raw material
used in the production of cortisone. Id.
98. During the NRDC's first 15 years, it received revenues of £3,300,000 which covered
its administrative expenses, but did not cover development advance of £6,000,000. The Pro-
ject Pushers, TIMES REV. INDUSTRY & TECH. 28 (Sept. 1965).
99. Id.
100. Selling Inventions, supra note 89, at 7.
101. See REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S STRIKE FORCE FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT 25 (July 15, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as FULL EMPLOYMENT REPORT]. This study was authorized by Conn. Ex.
Order 8. The Report examines the NRDC and determines that such a corporation could
provide substantial benefits for Connecticut.
102. Connecticut Product Development Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-47 (West
Supp. 1980). The Act's constitutionality was challenged in Wilson v. Connecticut Product
Dev. Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 355 A.2d 72 (1974), in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held that the Act contained adequate standards to guide the discretion of the officers of the
CPDC in their administration of the program, and thus was not an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority. The court further concluded that establishing the CPDC was a
valid exercise of legislative authority because the CPDC served a public purpose. 167 Conn.
at 117-18, 122-23, 355 A.2d at 76, 78.
103. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, at 4.
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-39 (West Supp. 1980).
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shortage of venture capital available to develop and exploit inven-
tions and products, resulting in a serious decrease in the develop-
ment of new businesses and job opportunities in Connecticut.'05 By
providing capital to deserving firms through the CPDC,'°0 the leg-
islature hoped to provide and maintain employment and increase
tax revenues.'0 7 The CPDC was also devised to induce businesses
to locate and remain in the state.'08 The CPDC's Board consists of
seven directors, five of whom must be familiar with the develop-
ment of technological inventions. 109 The Corporation is financed
with state bonds," 0 the amount of bonds outstanding at one time
not to exceed ten million dollars."' Unlike its British counter-
part,"' the CPDC has no dollar limitation on the investment it
may make in any one firm. The State Bond Commission may re-
quire the repayment of bonds issued to fund the CPDC "as shall
seem desirable consistent with the purposes of this chapter."'"
105. Id. § 32-39.
106. Id. § 32-40. In determining whether a firm is deserving the CPDC will consider the
firm's history, wage standards, job opportunities, stability of employment, past and present
financial condition and structure, present and future market prospects, and integrity of
management as well as the feasibility and commercial viability of the product. Id.
107. Id. § 32-33.
108. Id. The Connecticut legislature found "[t]hat the availability of financial assistance
is an important inducement to industrial and commercial enterprises to remain or locate in
the state. . . . Id. The cost of capital, however, does not weigh heavily in a firm's locational
choice. New Development Finance Techniques, supra note 1, at 18.
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-35 (West Supp. 1980).
110. Id. § 41. The CPDC is financed by general obligation bonds. Ordinarily these are
not an appropriate source of funds, because debt service payments must be made regularly
on the bonds, while royalty income will fluctuate. Connecticut has circumvented this prob-
lem by providing that the CPDC's debt service come out of general tax revenue. FINANCING
NEW BUSINEss DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 14.
111. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-41 (West Supp. 1980).
112. Development of Inventions Act, 1967, c.32, § 4(2)(b) as amended by Industry Act,
1975, c.68, § 26. The NRDC's grants generally are limited to £20,000 but a greater amount
may be awarded with special permission of the Minister of Technology. Id.
113. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-32 to 32-41 (West Supp. 1980). The state's option to
require repayment is a problem which the CPDC and NRDC share. Because funding is only
provided when necessary, the CPDC has a difficult time planning, and cannot adequately
finance its operations out of portfolio income. As a result, it is likely to be too dependent on
the other concerns of the state treasury. FINANCING NEw BUSINEss DEVELOPMENT, supra note
7, at 15. If the legislature is the intermediary's only source of funds, the intermediary will be
very vulnerable, because executives of the corporation will structure their behavior in a way
consistent with these external funding relationships. The corporation will therefore be sub-
jected to the annual budget cycle of the legislature and will have to deal with an extraordi-
nary range of irrelevant issues in order to obtain funds. A vulnerable institution will either
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However, the terms for repayment may include the waiver of inter-
est or an extension for the repayment of principal or interest or
both.114
The CPDC provides grants to existing companies for purposes of
developing a specific new product." ' In return, the CPDC receives
royalties on the sales of these products."" The royalty rate neces-
sary for CPDC to recapture its investment is based on the sales
figures for firms in the relevant geographic area or industry.
1 7
The CPDC has not been as successful as the NRDC. The CPDC
was devised primarily to bolster the economy and to attract new
business to Connecticut." 8 Although the most effective mechanism
for creating new jobs under the CPDC is to aid new, small firms,"I°
the CPDC makes most of its grants to existing firms. 20 Further-
more, although the inventors who occupy five of the seven'seats on
the CPDC's Board of Directors may be well qualified to determine
whether an invention can be developed into a product, they may
lack the business expertise to determine which combination of
products will maximize the royalty returns. 2 1 The CPDC has also
exercise excessive fiscal restraint or will conform its views to those currently in power in
order to survive. 1978 Working Papers, supra note 3, at 146.
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-41 (West Supp. 1980).
115. Royalty Financing, supra note 7, Abstract. The CPDC usually makes its grants to
well-established firms with five to fifty employees with sales of $.5 to $2.5 million. FINANCING
NEW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 9. The CPDC does not support basic re-
search, which is the province of the Connecticut Research Commission. Rather, the CPDC
finances the development of a product once the basic research has been completed. The
CPDC's province does not extend to actual production; it acts as a gap filler, as does the
NRDC. See FULL EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 101, at 32. Although the CPDC is not
usually involved in production or research, it is getting more involved in marketing and
production because this financing is not easily obtainable from private sources. FINANCING
NEW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 9-10.
116. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra note 7, Abstract. For a discussion of the benefits of the
royalty method, see notes 62-68 supra and accompanying text.
117. Id. Generally the CPDC pays 60% of the product development costs in return for a
five percent royalty on the net sales of the product. The flow of royalties ceases when the
CPDC has received five times its contribution. FINANCING NEW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 7, at 13.
118. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
121. Venture capitalists might be best able to select the proper pool of products because
they normally calculate risk when they finance new companies. ROYALTY FINANCING, supra
note 7, at 2. Bankers may be no improvement over scientists because they have the same
concerns as conventional debt lenders and may not be aggressive enough in locating ap-
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failed to ally itself with a consulting firm to screen potential appli-
cants.112 This failure is consistent with the CPDC's emphasis on
supporting existing firms,123 rather than financing new, more risky
ventures.
Since 1974 the CPDC has committed only $1.4 million to devel-
opment and has approved only nineteen projects.124 Because it uses
the royalty finance method, however, the CPDC provides the bene-
fits inherent in the approach. The CPDC provides patient money,
it does not force the firm to be bought out against its will, it yields
an increased return if the venture is successful and permits a re-
turn to be realized without liquidation of the investment.1 2
VI. Conclusion
Traditional sources of capital-debt, equity and venture capital
funds-have not provided adequate financing for new firms; there-
fore, governments have intervened to channel capital to these
firms. As a result of the ineffectiveness of existing government pro-
grams, new methods of financing have been sought.
The royalty method is a desirable way to finance new, small
firms because it provides a firm with patient money, while provid-
ing the investor with a potentially greater return if the venture is
successful, without forcing the investor to liquidate his investment.
The royalty method has been implemented in England by the
NRDC and in Connecticut by the CPDC. In England, the method
has been successful as a tool for developing new products, although
no figures are available to show the NRDC's impact on the econ-
omy. In Connecticut, where the method has been used primarily as
an economic stimulus, it has not been as successful, because the
propriate firms. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 84.
122. FINANCING NEW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 17. The development cor-
porations in Massachusetts and Kentucky, which rely on consulting firms, are considered to
be the most successful of the state corporations. A consulting firm may be better able to
evaluate the risk associated -with the various grant applicants. Id. at 17-18. See also INNOVA-
TIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 3, at 85. For an example of public and private
sources acting jointly, see Economic Capital Corporation of New York City, Fact Sheet at 1
(the corporation was formed to create jobs by combining the resources of private financial
institutions with the resources of public programs and agencies to provide better access to
financing for New York City businesses).
123. FINANCING NEw BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at 18.
124. Id.
125. See notes 62-68 supra and accompanying text.
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CPDC has failed to provide financing to those firms that can most
benefit by the method - new, small firms. Because the CPDC has
not financed new, small firms, it has not fulfilled the principal ob-
jective of the Connecticut Product Development Act. The CPDC
assumes too much risk to be successful as a traditional lending in-
stitution, and accepts too little risk to be an effective economic
stimulus. Properly applied to new, small firms, however, the roy-
alty method would be an effective method to stimulate industrial
development and increase employment and tax revenues.
Michael Katovitz
